it if not a vagina? These are completely feminine attributes. Yes, but Alexina has never menstruated; the whole outer part of her body is that of a man, and my explorations did not enable me to find a womb.... Finally, to sum up the matter, ovoid bodies and spermatic cords are found by touch in a divided scrotum. These are the real proofs of sex. We can now conclude and say: Alexina is a man, hermaphroditic, no doubt, but with an obvious predominance of masculine sexual characteristics. [HB, pp. 127-28; my emphasis]
Notice that the real proofs of sex are to be found in the anatomical structure of Barbin's sexual organs.
Writing nine years later in the Journal de l'anatomie et de la physiologie de l'homme, Dr. E. Goujon definitively confirms Chesnet's conclusions by using that great technique of pathological anatomy, the autopsy. After discussing Barbin's external genital organs, Goujon offers a detailed account of his internal genital organs:
Upon opening the body, one saw that only the epididymis of the left testicle had passed through the ring; it was smaller than the right one; the vasa deferentia drew near each other behind and slightly below the bladder, and had normal connections with the seminal vesicles. Two ejaculatory canals, one on each side of the vagina, protruded from beneath the mucous membrane of the vagina and traveled from the vesicles to the vulvar orifice. The seminal vesicles, the right one being a little larger than the left, were distended by sperm that had a normal consistency and color.
[HB, pp. 135-36] All of medical science, with its style of pathological anatomy, agreed with Auguste Tardieu when he claimed in his revealingly titled book, Question medico-legale de l'identite dans ses rapports avec les vices de conformation des organes sexuels, that "to be sure, the appearances that are typical of the feminine sex were carried very far in his case, but both science and the law were nevertheless obliged to recognize the error and to recognize the true sex of this young man" (HB, p. 123). Let me now bypass a number of decades. It is 1913, and the great psychologist of sex, Havelock Ellis, has written a paper called "SexoAesthetic Inversion" that appears in Alienist and Neurologist. It begins as follows:
By "sexual inversion", we mean exclusively such a change in a person's sexual impulses, the result of inborn constitution, that the impulse is turned towards individuals of the same sex, while all the other impulses and tastes may remain those of the sex to which the person by anatomical configuration belongs. There is, however, a wider kind of inversion, which not only covers much more than the direction of the sexual impulses, but may not, and indeed frequently does not, include the sexual impulse at all. This inversion is that by which a person's tastes and impulses are so altered that, if a man, he emphasizes and even exaggerates the feminine characteristics in his own person, delights in manifesting feminine aptitudes and very especially, finds peculiar satisfaction in dressing himself as a woman and adopting a woman's ways. Yet the subject of this perversion experiences the normal sexual attraction, though in some cases the general inversion of tastes may extend, it may be gradually, to the sexual impulses.'1
After describing some cases, Ellis writes further,
The precise nature of aesthetic inversion can only be ascertained by presenting illustrative examples. There are at least two types of such cases; one, the most common kind, in which the inversion is mainly confined to the sphere of clothing, and another, less common but more complete, in which cross-dressing is regarded with comparative indifference but the subject so identifies himself with those of his physical and psychic traits which recall the opposite sex that he feels really to belong to that sex, although he has no delusion regarding his anatomical conformation. '2 In categorizing disorders, Ellis' clear separation of two distinct kinds of things, anatomical configuration and psychic traits, provides a surface manifestation of a profound and wide-ranging epistemological mutation. It is what makes possible sexo-aesthetic inversion, as a disease, in the first place.
Ellis' discussion descends from the psychiatric style of reasoning that begins, roughly speaking, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a period during which rules for the production of true discourses about sexuality change radically. Sexual identity is no longer exclusively linked to the anatomical structure of the internal and external genital organs. It is now a matter of impulses, tastes, aptitudes, satisfactions, and psychic traits. There is a whole new set of concepts that makes it possible to detach questions of sexual identity from facts about anatomy, a possibility that only came about with the emergence of a new style of reasoning. And with this new style of reasoning came entirely new kinds of sexual diseases and disorders. As little as 150 years ago, psychiatric theories of sexual identity disorders were not false, but rather were not even possible candidates of truth-or-falsehood.13 Only with the birth of a psychiatric style of reasoning were there categories of evidence, verification, explanation, and so on that allowed such theories to be true-or-false. And lest you think that Ellis' discussion is outdated, I should point out that the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association discusses disorders of sexual identity in terms that are almost conceptually identical to those of Ellis. It calls these disorders, "characterized by the individual's feelings of discomfort and inappropriateness about his or her anatomic sex and by persistent behaviors generally associated with the other sex," gender identity disorders.14 We live with the legacy of this relatively recent psychiatric style of reasoning, so foreign to earlier medical theories of sex. So-called sex change operations were not only technologically impossible in earlier centuries; they were conceptually impossible as well. Before the second half of the nineteenth century persons of a determinate anatomical sex could not be thought to be really, that is, psychologically, of the opposite sex. Anatomical sex exhausted one's sexual identity; psychological considerations could not have provided the basis for "sex reassignment surgery" since these considerations were not so much as relevant to the question of one's sexual identity. Our current medical concept of sex reassignment would have been unintelligible or incoherent since it could not cohere with the style of reasoning about sexual identity.
The anatomical style of reasoning took sex as its object of investigation and concerned itself with diseases of structural abnormality, with pathological changes that resulted from some macroscopic or microscopic anatomical change. It is for this reason that hermaphroditism most visibly exemplifies this mode of reasoning. But for sexuality to become an object of clinical knowledge, a new style of psychiatric reasoning was necessary. Ellis' discussion already takes for granted the new style of reasoning and so treats sexuality and its attendant disorders, such as sexo-aesthetic inversion, as if they were naturally given. Even as sophisticated a historian as Aries can conflate these different objects of clinical investigation, with the inevitable historical confusion that results. Writing about homosexuality he declares, "The anomaly condemned was one of sexual ambiguity, the effeminate man, the woman with male organs, the hermaphrodite."15 But any attempt to write a unified history that passed from hermaphroditism to homosexuality would solder together figures that an adequate historical epistemology must keep separate. The hermaphrodite and the homosexual are as different as the genitalia and the psyche. The notion of a style of reasoning helps us to see how this is so.
Indeed, I do not think it would be going too far to defend the claim, paradoxical though it may seem, that sexuality itself is a product of the psychiatric style of reasoning. Sexuality only became a possible object of psychological investigation, theorizing, and speculation because of a distinctive form of reasoning that had a historically specific origin; or to put it another way, statements about sexuality came to possess a positivity, a being true-or-false, only when the conceptual space associated with the psychiatric style of reasoning was first articulated. A somewhat pedestrian, though still surprising, confirmation of this claim is in fact provided by looking at the origin of the word "sexuality." The very word "sexuality," as well as our concept of sexuality, first appears, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, in the late nineteenth century. The O.E.D. gives as its first example of "sexuality," defined as "possession of sexual powers, or capability of sexual feelings," a statement from 1879 made inJ. M. Duncan's Diseases of Women: "In removing the ovaries, you do not necessarily destroy sexuality in a woman." Nothing could be a better illustration of my claim that sexuality is an object distinct from the anatomical style of reasoning about diseases. A woman's sexuality is not reducible to facts about, or to the existence of, her reproductive system, and given this understanding it was necessary to have a way of conceptualizing sexuality that permitted one to say something about it without invoking, in any essential way, those anatomical facts. It is the psychiatric style of reasoning that made such talk possible in medicine, that made it possible to make statements such as Duncan's. Without this style of reasoning we would be forever talking about sex, not about sexuality. The answer to these questions is neither yes nor no, since the questions get their sense from the psychiatric style of reasoning, which has no application whatsoever to a spermatozoon. We quite literally do not understand the claim that "a man has sex, a spermatozoon sexuality" for there is no such thing as sexuality outside of the psychiatric style of reasoning. The irreducible weirdness or incomprehensibility of Buck's claim is a good example of how specific concepts are produced by distinctive styles of reasoning, of how we think about sexuality, and of how we distinguish between sex and sexuality. In looking for the origin of our concept of sexuality, we do well to heed Oscar Wilde's advice that "it is only shallow people who do notjudge by appearances." We should examine the word "sexuality" in the sites in which it is used, that is, we must look at the sentences in which "sexuality" appears, and see what is done with these sentences by the various people who use them. Typically, at least when we are dealing with an epistemological break, we will find that the concept under investigation enters into systematic relation with other very specific concepts, and that it is used in distinctive kinds of sentences to perform regular, because often repeated, functions. What we must avoid is the attempt to go behind the appearances, to offer some subtle hermeneutic reconstruction that ignores or overrides the surface of sentences.
If anyone believes that I have so far been talking only about words and not about things, that I have not exited from concepts to the world, it will be helpful at this point to recall some examples of Wittgensteinian criteria. In the most compelling discussion I know of Wittgenstein's notions And pain can be deadened (not altered, as an opinion), or obtunded (not dampened, as a mood); you can locate certain pains, or have to, by prodding, i.e., by activating them, causing them afresh, focussing them; we speak of someone as in pain, but not as in pleasure (and as in mourning and in ecstasy, but not as in joy or in rage); you can cause pain but not pleasure, which is given and is taken (like pride and courage, but unlike happiness, which can only be found; though you can make someone proud and happy, and so also ashamed and unhappy); and so on.16
Is it only part of our concept of pain that we say it can be deadened or obtunded, but not altered or dampened, that we say someone is in pain but not in pleasure, that we cause pain but give pleasure? Or is it in the nature of pain itself that we can say these things of it? Cavell's grammar of pain is meant to show that any such facile distinction collapses under the weight of this example. And in this same chapter, entitled "What a Thing Is (Called)," contrasting what he calls the Austinian kind of object and the Wittgensteinian kind of object, he shows more specifically that "if you do not know the grammatical criteria of Wittgensteinian objects, then you lack, as it were, not only a piece of information or knowledge, but the possibility of acquiring any information about such objects uberhaupt; you cannot be told the name of that object because there is as yet no object of that kind for you to attach a forthcoming name to."17 In these terms, I can formulate my claim by saying that sexuality is a Wittgensteinian object and that no one could know the grammatical criteria of this object before the emergence of the psychiatric style of reasoning, which is to say that before this time there was as yet no object for us to attach the name "sexuality" to.
I recognize that I am defending a very strong, counterintuitive, even seemingly unnatural, thesis here, so let me try to increase its plausibility. I want to approach this issue by discussing some aspects of Leo Steinberg's brilliant book, The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion.18 Although I am going to focus almost exclusively on a conceptual inadequacy in Steinberg's account, I do not for a moment wish to diminish the major achievement of his book, which transcends the boundaries of any single discipline, articulating issues that take the reader far from the or studied, covers something of genuine significance that is all too naturally missed. It is this automatic and immediate application of concepts, as though concepts have no temporality, that allows, and often requires, us to draw misleading analogies and inferences that derive from a historically inappropriate and conceptually untenable perspective. So let me turn to some representations of sex and sexuality in order to underline their radical differences.
The iconographical representation of sex proceeds by depiction of the body, more specifically by depiction of the genitalia. The iconographical representation of sexuality is given by depiction of the personality, and it most usually takes the form of depiction of the face and its expressions. the alternative reading that the fingers "could well be behind the penis" which is supposed to be made "most likely" by the fact that "her other fingers are around his knee" is hardly likely at all. If Saint Anne's fingers were actually around Christ's knee, it would be more natural for her thumb to be extended, which it is not, and for her wrist to be angled more toward her body. Moreover, and most important, the placement of her left hand is more than a little awkward if Saint Anne is lifting Christ from Mary's arms. If, on this interpretation, the supporting right hand is actually doing the lifting, then the position of the other hand is entirely unmotivated. The alternative interpretation is that the left hand is supposed to be participating in the lifting. But if one simply places one's hands in the exact position of Saint Anne's and then attempts to lift an infant from the angle from which she is purported to be lifting Christ, one all too quickly sees that the most straightforward function of this placement of the left hand would be to strain or dislocate the child's left knee or hip. Steinberg's historical erudition in interpreting paintings is not made at the expense of the perspicacity of his eye. The face having been examined in repose, it is necessary, in order to study the facial reaction, to engage the patient in conversation, or if he is suffering from much intellectual weakness, to ask him a question or make some statement or movement calculated to arouse his attention, and then to watch the changes of facial expression carefully, or to note their absence.... Attention to these simple directions, together with a general knowledge of the facial signs given below, will enable any practitioner to refer most cases to one of the ten great symptomatic groups into which I have divided mental cases for the purposes of this monograph. Many cases will be further capable of diagnosis as to the subdivisions etiological, pathological, or symptomatic, to which they belong, and in most others the medical man will be put on the way to a diagnosis to be confirmed by the patient's speech, conversation, conduct, and anamnesia (personal and family history).24 resented ... is the subject of a mild form of sexual perversion, leading him to object to wear male attire except under compulsion. His face suggests effeminacy, and his sloping shoulders strengthen the impression. It is often the case that male sexual perverts resemble females, and vice versa."25 There is obviously no question that the resemblance here is one of sexuality, not of sex. The pervert's tastes, impulses, desires, dispositions, and so forth exhibit feminine sexuality, all emblematized by the effeminacy of his face. A statement such as Duncan's that removing the ovaries does not necessarily destroy a woman's sexuality, thus divorcing sexuality from sex, was part of the conceptual space that made it possible for males to exhibit feminine sexuality and vice versa, made it possible for there to be kinds of sexuality that did not correspond to an individual's sex. Let me return briefly to Steinberg in order to anticipate, without fully answering, a possible objection to my account. There is a sustained Christian tradition of discussions of Christ's virginity and chastity, a tradition present in many Renaissance sermons, and it might appear that this tradition is explicitly directed to Christ's sexuality, not merely to his sex. After all, how is one to understand chastity except by reference to sexuality? But as Steinberg emphasizes, chastity consists of physiological potency under check; it is a triumph of the will over the flesh and is exemplary because of the volitional abstinence in the face of the physiological possibility of sexual activity (see SC, p. 17 and excursis 15). Commenting on a painting of Andrea del Sarto, Steinberg notices that he "contrasts the Christ Child's stiffer member with that of St. John-a differentiation which suggests the likeliest reason for the motif: it demonstrates in the Infant that physiological potency without which the chastity of the man would count for nought" (SC, p. 79). Chastity and virginity are moral categories denoting a relation between the will and the flesh; they are not categories of sexuality. Although we tend to read back our own categories of sexuality into older moral categories, partly because it is often so difficult for us to distinguish them precisely, it is crucial to my argument that we separate the two. Blurring the two kinds of categories leads to epistemological and conceptual lack of differentiation, and results in the historiographical infection that the great French historian of science Georges Canguilhem has called the "virus of the precursor."26 We perpetually look for precursors to our categories of sexuality in essentially different domains, producing anachronisms at best and unintelligibility at worst. The distinction between categories of morality and sexuality raises extraordinarily difficult issues, but I think it could be shown, for example, that even Aquinas' discussion of the parts or species of lust in part 2.2, question 154 of the Summa Theologica ought not to be assimilated be supplemented by the story of the emergence of perversion as a disease category, something I have attempted elsewhere.30 Or to be more precise, our experience of sexuality was born at the same time that perversion emerged as the kind of deviation by which sexuality was ceaselessly threatened. I have argued not only that our medical concept of perversion did not exist prior to the mid-nineteenth century but also that there were no perverts before the existence of this concept. This shift from the emergence of a concept ("perversion") to the emergence of a kind of person (the pervert), to return to an issue I have already mentioned, is underwritten by the doctrine that Ian Hacking has called "dynamic nominalism." Hacking argues that in many domains of the human sciences, "categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between these processes." Dynamic nominalism shows how "history plays an essential role in the constitution of the objects, where the objects are the people and ways in which they behave," since the human sciences "bring into being new categories which, in part, bring into being new kinds of people."31 Hacking gives multiple personality as an example of making up people and provides other examples from the history of statistics.32 Perverts and the history of perversion are a still further example of making up people. Our experience of sexuality is all that there is to sexuality itself, and this experience was decisively and quite recently formed by a set of concepts or categories, among them "perversion," and an associated style of reasoning. That stripes upon the back and loins, as parts appropriated for the generating of the seed, and carrying it to the genitals, warm and inflame those parts, and contribute very much to the irritation of lechery. From all which, it is no wonder that such shameless wretches, victims of a detested appetite such as we have mentioned [masturbation], or others exhausted by too frequent repetition, their loins and their vessels being drained, have sought a remedy by flogging. For it is very probable that the refrigerated parts grow warm by such stripes, and excite a heat in the seminal matter, and that the pain of the flogged parts, which is the reason that the blood and spirits are attracted in greater quantity, communicate heat also to the organs of generation, and thereby the perverse and frenzical appetite is satisfied. Then nature, though unwilling, is drawn beyond the stretch of her common power, and becomes a party to the commission of such an abominable crime. [FVA, p.
30]34
In the next paragraph, Meibomius' underlying aim in writing this treatise becomes clearer. As a physician, he has evidently cured a number of men, otherwise unable to perform the act of generation, with this treatment of stripes and strokes upon the back. This remedy seems to have become the object of much discussion and questioning among both fellow physicians and laypersons. Meibomius admits that perhaps some of those who come to him for treatment are simply exhausted by excess venery and request his treatment merely so that they can continue the "same filthy enjoyment." But he demands of those who question this practice, "You must, in all conscience, also ask: whether a person who has practised lawful love, and yet perceives his loins and sides languid, may not, without the imputation of any crime, make use of the same method, in order to discharge a debt which I won't say is due, but to please the creditor?" (FVA, p. 30). Meibomius wants to vindicate his practice by arguing that the use of whips in the affairs of Venus can be a justified therapeutic modality, one that physician and patient can practice without the imputation of any crime to either one.
These quotations already allow us to anticipate my argument that Meibomius' treatise is not a counterexample to the claim that perversion does not emerge as a medical phenomenon until the nineteenth century. Before I set out this argument, however, let me remind you how masochism was understood by nineteenth-century psychiatry. For this understanding, we do best to turn again to Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis, since Returning to Meibomius' treatise, we find, first of all, that there is not even the slightest implication that people who are whipped, even for venereal purposes, suffer from a disease or disorder which manifests itself in a desire for such whippings. In 1629 there was no possible disease which consisted in the pleasure in having oneself whipped; the very idea of such a disease could not be conceptualized. It is only one of many similar ironies in the history of medicine that far from being a disease, the whipping of patients, and even the desire of some patients for these whippings, was thought to be therapeutically mandated and justified. is whether the lust whipping arouses is always morally prohibited, whether it can ever be so aroused "without the imputation of any crime." The question is not whether there is some kind of person for whom only such whipping provides an adequate psychological satisfaction.
This reading of the treatise is further supported by two additional essays appended to it when it was reprinted in 1669. In neither of these essays is there any anticipation of the set of concepts necessary to describe the phenomenon of masochism. Indeed, all three essays, when not attempting to produce a physiological explanation of the effects caused by whipping, fit squarely into the tradition of moral philosophy and theology that deals with the nature and kinds of lust. Although I cannot discuss this tradition in any detail here, I want to make a few, general background remarks. In book 12 of the City of God Augustine uses the theological concept of perversion to describe evil acts of the will. The will is perversely affected when it fails to adhere to God, when it defects from the immutable to mutable good. Perversion is not intrinsically connected with lust, but describes any act of the will that is contrary to God and so is contrary to nature.36 In part 2.2, question 154 of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas argues that there are unnatural vices that are a determinate species of lust, since they are contrary not merely to right reason, which is common to all lustful vices, but, in addition, "contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race."37 However, even in Aquinas' fascinating attempt to distinguish kinds of lust, it is clear that distinct species of lust do not map onto distinct kinds of individuals; we are all subject to all the kinds of lust, and the principle by which we distinguish lusts from one another does not permit us to distinguish different types of people from one another. In this tradition of moral theology, one classifies kinds of sins, not primarily kinds of individuals and certainly not kinds of disorders.
In fact, Krafft-Ebing was quite concerned with the issue of flagellation as it came to be discussed in moral philosophy and theology. He devotes a section of Psychopathia Sexualis to distinguishing carefully between passive flagellation and masochism, insisting that the former is a perversity, and therefore an appropriate topic of ethical and legal discussion, while only the latter is a genuine perversion, a medical phenomenon:
It is not difficult to show that masochism is something essentially different from flagellation, and more comprehensive. For the masochist the principal thing is subjection to the woman; the punishment is only the expression of this relation-the most intense effect of it he can bring upon himself. For him the act has only a symbolic value, and is a means to the end of mental satisfaction of Krafft-Ebing goes on to specify further the characteristics that distinguish the masochist from the "weakened debauchee" who desires passive flagellation, the most significant of these characteristics being psychological. He concludes by claiming that masochism bears to simple flagellation a relation analogous to that between inverted sexual instinct and pederasty; both of these relations are examples of the more general contrast between perversion and perversity, and hence of disease and moral deviation. The phenomenon of masochism, like the general phenomenon of perversion, is a thoroughly modern phenomenon. As Krafft-Ebing remarks, without any further comment, the perversion of masochism was, up until the time of Sacher-Masoch, "quite unknown to the scientific world as such" (PS, p. 87).
Let me return one last time to Meibomius' treatise to make a final conceptual point. In this treatise, the adjective "perverse" occurs twice, once in the phrase "perverse and frenzical appetite" and a second time in the phrase "vices of perverse lust" (FVA, pp. 30, 22). The context of both occurrences makes it clear that "perverse" is used as a general term of disapprobation, although precisely what the disapproval consists in is not further specified. Indeed, if one looks at lexical patterns in the treatises of moral philosophy and theology that discuss perversion, and even in the pre-nineteenth-century medical works that seem to deal with this topic, the adjectival, adverbial, and verb forms, "perverse," "perversely," and "to pervert," appear to occur far more predominantly than either the noun form "perversion" or, especially, the noun form "pervert." However, I do not want merely to claim that the numerical occurrences of the noun form are far fewer than adjective, adverb, and verb, although in the works I have examined this appears to be the case. But even apart from looking at and counting lexical patterns, I think it can be argued that the noun had a conceptually derivative place in moral theology but a conceptually central place in nineteenth-century medicine. One could confirm this claim by studying, for instance, the use of this term in Augustine's City of God. And just about the time that Meibomius' treatise was published, a common use in English of the noun "pervert" was as an antonym to "convert"-a pervert being one that is turned from good to evil, and a convert being the contrary. This usage clearly implies that the primary phenomenon is to be located in the perverse choices and actions of the individual, someone being a pervert or convert depending on the person's ethical choices.
In Krafft-Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis, however, we have a book devoted to the description, indeed the constitution, of four types of characters: the homosexual or invert, the sadist, the masochist, and the fetishist. That is to say, we have a book that sets forth the intrinsic distinguishing characteristics of a new kind of person-the pervert. KrafftEbing insisted that to diagnose the pervert correctly one "must investigate the whole personality of the individual" (PS, p. 53). He continually emphasizes that diagnosis cannot proceed simply by examining the sexual acts performed. One must rather investigate impulses, feelings, urges, desires, fantasies, tendencies, and so on, and the result of this investigation will be to mark off new kinds of persons, distinct and separate from the normal heterosexual individual. It is the pervert who is primary, perverse choices and actions being subordinated to a conceptually subsidiary role. If in psychiatry the conceptual focus moves from perverse choice to the pervert, and if linguistic forms reflect such conceptual changes, then it should come as no surprise that we find more distinctive and frequent use there of "pervert" and even "perversion."
Connected with this new focus is the fact that nineteenth-century psychiatry often took sexuality to be the way in which the mind is best represented. To know a person's sexuality is to know that person. Sexuality is the externalization of the hidden, inner essence of personality. And to know sexuality, to know the person, we must know its anomalies. Krafft-Ebing was quite clear about this point. In his Text-book of Insanity, a massive book that covers the entire field of mental abnormality, he writes, "These anomalies are very important elementary disturbances, since upon the nature of sexual sensibility the mental individuality in greater part depends."38 Sexuality individualizes, turns one into a specific kind of human being-a sadist, masochist, homosexual, fetishist. This link between sexuality and individuality explains some of the passion with which psychiatry constituted the pervert. The more details we have about the anomalies of perversion, the better we are able to penetrate the covert individuality of the self. Only a psychiatrist, after meticulous examination, could recognize a real pervert. Or to be more accurate, it was also thought that there was one other kind of person who could recognize a true pervert, even without meticulous examination: as if by a kind of hypersensitive perception, a pervert could recognize one of his own kind. Of course, much more historical detail would be needed to produce an unequivocally convincing argument that proves the conceptual shift from perverse choice to the pervert. But anyone who reads a few dozen of the relevant texts in moral theology and psychiatry will, I think Much of my discussion has been concerned with a rupture in styles of reasoning within medicine, a break from pathological anatomy in all its forms to the emergence of psychiatric reasoning. This rupture delineates a problematic internal to the history of medicine. However, my discussion of Meibomius' treatise and the issues it raises, as well as of Steinberg's remarks on the chastity of Christ, opens up a companion problem, one not internal to the history of medicine but rather centered on medicine's appropriation of an initially related, but unmedicalized domain. It is not that medicine simply took over the study of what had once been a part of morality; moral deviation did not merely transform itself into disease. Instead, the moral phenomenon of the perversity of the will furnished a point of reference that both opened the way for and provided an obstacle to the medical constitution of perversion. This problematic, which has barely begun to be worked out in detail, concerns a crossing of the "threshold of scientificity."40 Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, has very precisely described the questions that must be answered in attempting to understand how such a threshold can be crossed. Describing not his own position but that of Canguilhem and Gaston Bachelard, the kind of history of science he calls an "epistemological history of the sciences," Foucault writes:
Its purpose is to discover, for example, how a concept-still overlaid with metaphors or imaginary contents-was purified, and accorded the status and function of a scientific concept. To discover how a region of experience that has already been mapped, already partially articulated, but is still overlaid with immediate practical uses or values related to those uses, was constituted as a scientific domain. To discover how, in general, a science was established over and against a pre-scientific level, which both paved the way and resisted it in advance, how it succeeded in overcoming the obstacles and limitations that still stood in its way.41 I know of no better succinct description of what is at stake at this level of analysis. An adequate history of the psychiatric emergence of sexuality will have to look not only to shifts in styles of reasoning within medicine but also to the multilayered relations between our ethical descriptions of sexual practices and their scientific counterparts. 
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